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Introduction
In his Refutation of Idealism, Kant distinguishes between two types of idealism. Proble-
matic idealism is “the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be […] 
merely doubtful and indemonstrable” (KrV, B 274), whereas dogmatic idealism is the theory that 
declares the existence of objects in space to be “false and impossible”, and things in space “to 
be merely imaginary” (KrV, B 274). In the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental 
Psychology, we encounter what is fundamentally the same distinction: “[t]he dogmatic idealist 
would be one who denies the existence of matter, the skeptical idealist one who doubts it be-
cause he holds it to be unprovable” (KrV, A 377).
Nonetheless, the Refutation of Idealism is not a refutation of dogmatic idealism, since Kant 
considers such a refutation no longer necessary: “[t]he ground for this [dogmatic] idealism, 
however, has been undercut by us in the Transcendental Aesthetic” (KrV, B 274). According to 
Kant’s reading of dogmatic idealism, the impossibility of outer things on this view derives from 
a transcendental realist conception of space. Dogmatic idealism considers space as a form of 
things in themselves. Yet if space were a form of things in themselves, Kant alleges, it would be 
a non-entity, and things in space would have to be considered imaginary. Such a conception 
of space is therefore absurd. According to the Transcendental Aesthetic, space is a form of sen-
sibility, and things in space are perfectly possible. With this noted, the argument according to 






Kant’s “self” as a Being in the World
My aim in this paper is to trace the introduction of a new and revolutionary conception 
of “self” as “Weltwesen” in Kant’s refutation of problematic or sceptical idealism. The full develo-
pment of this conception takes time. Thus I start with Kant’s Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism 
(1781), where such a conception of “self” is not yet present. In the first section of this paper, 
we encounter two senses of object: mere representation and thing in itself. At this point, outer 
objects are reduced to mere representations, and Kant’s “self” is merely a desubstantialized 
Cartesian “self”. Section 2 then investigates Kant’s theory of inferential cognition of existences 
with the aim of demonstrating why it is impossible to solve the problem of idealism by consi-
dering perceived outer objects as things in themselves. The third section focuses on a critical 
conception of “object”, i.e. a critical and novel way of considering outer objects as things in 
themselves within Transcendental Idealism. Sections 4-7 summarize the Refutation of Idealism 
in 1787 as an appeal to a totally new type of immediate cognition. Finally, section 8 shows 
how a “self” that is integrated in space – an embodied self – emerges from a proper reading of 
premises 2 and 3 of the Refutation of Idealism. My final remarks make this result explicit. This 
paper therefore follows Kant’s path to the Refutation of Idealism, reaching a conclusion regar-
ding Kant’s final conception of “self” that combines Guyer’s (1987) and Carl’s (2006) views on 
the concept.
1. The Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism
The first refutation of sceptical or problematic idealism in Kant’s critical period consisted 
in an attempt to refute “a false scruple concerning the objective reality of our outer perceptions” 
(KrV, A 376). This is precisely the above-mentioned Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism of Trans-
cendental Psychology, a text withdrawn from the second edition of the first Critique. The argu-
ment focuses on a duality with regard to representations. Representations are space-temporal 
whenever they represent empirical objects external to the self and merely temporal whenever 
they represent states internal to the self. Thus the argument concerns an application of the re-
sults of the Transcendental Aesthetic to the problem of idealism. The aim is to show that outer 
objects are objects of immediate experience in the same way that internal objects are. In the end, 
they are all representations. Hence, the genus “representation” divides into two species: inner 






Kant does emphasize the assimilation of the object to its representation, which justifies 
Guyer’s presentation of the argument as reductionist (1987, p. 281). For instance: 
1) “[M]atter […] is only a species of representations (intuition)” (KrV, A 370). 
2) “[E]xternal objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a 
species of my representations” (KrV, A 370). 
3) “[I]n both cases [regarding external objects and objects of my inner sense] they are 
nothing but representations” (KrV, A 371). 
4) “[I]ts intuition is space, but it is itself nothing other than an inner mode of representa-
tion” (KrV, A 378).
To sum up, outer objects are not only possible but real. Nonetheless, their reality is the rea-
lity of a mere representation. I believe the last claim synthesizes the “false scruple” that Kant aims 
to abolish: the scruple about considering matter as representation. Such a conception of matter is 
precisely one of the two senses of the expression “outside us” that Kant considers in the Criticism 
of the Fourth Paralogism – the only sense that really makes sense for Kant in that context: 
[T]he expression “outside us” carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes 
signifies something that, as a thing in itself, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely 
something that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use 
this concept in the latter significance – in which it is taken in the proper psychological ques-
tion about the reality of our outer intuition – we will distinguish empirically external objects 
from those that might be called “external” in the transcendental sense, by directly calling 
them “things that are to be encountered in space”. (KrV, A 373)
Problematic idealism “professes only our incapacity for proving an existence outside us 
from our own by means of immediate experience” (KrV, B 274). This means that problematic 
idealism derives from the alleged impossibility of immediate experience of outer objects in the 
first sense above: a thing distinct from the self. This is why the reduction of outer objects to a 
species of the genus “representation” – the second sense of “outside us” above – would solve the 
problem. There would be no need for an immediate experience of outer objects in the first sense 





tations as their determinate causes, since the outer representation itself would amount to the 
outer object.
At this point, we need a better understanding of the issues that Kant has with such an 
inference in order to be in a position to fully understand both the problem of idealism and why 
rejecting the reductionism in the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism does not amount to embra-
cing an inferential argument.
2. Inferential Cognition of Existence
It is impossible to understand the problem with idealism without dealing with the issue 
of inferential cognition of existence. Kant accepted only two ways of proving the existence of an 
object in the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology: causal inference and 
immediate perception. Since inference from a representation as an effect to the determinate cau-
se of the affection is not valid, Kant claims that the existence of an outer object is to be assimila-
ted to the existence of a mere representation, which is cognized through immediate perception.
It is worth examining in further detail the Kantian concept of “existence” and Kant’s posi-
tion concerning the cognition of existence via inference in the first Critique. In the Elucidation of 
The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General, existence involves the possibility that perception 
precedes the concept of the object. Existence is not a first-order predicate. It does not add content 
to the concept; rather, it simply means that there is a perception corresponding to the concept: 
[E]ven if this concept is so complete that it lacks nothing required for thinking of a thing 
with all of its inner determinations, still existence has nothing in the least to do with all of 
this, but only with the question of whether such a thing is given to us in such a way that the 
perception of it could in any case precede the concept. For that the concept precedes the 
perception signifies its mere possibility; but perception, which yields the material for the 
concept, is the sole characteristic of actuality. (KrV, A 225/B 272)
Nonetheless, Kant does allow for inferential cognition of the existence of an object – i.e. 
the possibility of cognition of existence that is not immediately perceived. It is possible to cog-
nize existence comparatively a priori: 





However, one can also cognize the existence of the thing prior to the perception of it, and 
therefore cognize it comparatively a priori, if only it is connected with some perceptions in 
accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (the analogies). For in that case 
the existence of the thing is still connected with our perceptions in a possible experience, 
and with the guidance of the analogies we can get from our actual perceptions to the thing 
in the series of possible perceptions. (KrV, A 225/B 273)
Also: “whatever is connected with this [some perception or other] in accordance with 
empirical laws is actual, even if it is not immediately perceived” (KrV, A 231/B 284).
In order to cognize the existence of something comparatively a priori, one must cognize, 
empirically, a connection between causes and effects in which the existence at issue plays a role. 
May one infer from the effect to the cause? Apparently, this is what we actually do when: “[e]very 
one of the large number of cases that we have examined in the past fits this generalization [that 
every event-type B is caused by event-type A]” (NOZICK, 2001, p. 50). Other empiricists – inclu-
ding of course Hume – adhere to the principle of same-effects-same-causes as a general rule, 
allowing the inferences at issue here (THN, 1.3.15, 6). Kant’s official answer, however, is “no”: 
“there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given 
appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in accordance with laws of causali-
ty” (KrV, A 227/B 279). Indeed, in note 1 to the Refutation of Idealism, we also encounter a remark 
about the unreliability of “any case in which one infers from given effects to determinate causes” 
(KrV, B 276). It is worth pointing out, however, that Kant himself seems to infer from effects to 
determinate causes in a famous example: “[t]hus we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter 
penetrating all bodies from the perception of attracted iron filings” (KrV, A 226/B 273, my italics). 
Also with noting is the fact that the inference rule accepted by Kant in such an example 
does not even require that the inferred existence be of an object of effective perception by a 
human cognizer: 
[A]n immediate perception of this matter is impossible for us given the constitution of our 
organs. For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions 
we could also happen upon the immediate empirical intuition of it in an experience if our 
senses, the crudeness of which does not affect the form of possible experience in general, 






With this famous example, Kant means that one should distinguish between an object 
of possible experience (any spatiotemporal object under principles of the understanding) and 
an object liable to be perceivable by sense organs of human animals (an object suitable for the 
empirical constitution of our senses).
But even if Kant may eventually admit inferences from the effect to the cause, and even if 
he indeed allows for the existence of objects or qualities not effectively observable by human cog-
nizers, inferential cognition of a transcendental cause of representations remains impossible. The 
issue with sceptical or problematic idealism may be located in the impossibility of inferring from 
an effect to a determinate cause, which, by definition, cannot be an object of possible experience 
– even in a broad sense – since an object in itself in that context would be the cause of the very per-
ceptions that constitute any possible experience, and not a possible part of the nexus of experience: 
“one cannot have sensation outside oneself, but only in oneself, and the whole of self-conscious-
ness therefore provides nothing other than merely our own determinations” (KrV, A 378). 
This means that one can move from parts of experience toward a transcendental cause of 
perceptions; however, one can never experience such a cause, which precludes the possibility 
of legitimate inference: “no existence of objects of the senses can be cognized fully a priori, but 
always only comparatively a priori relative to another already given existence […] [E]ven then 
we can only arrive at an existence that must be contained somewhere in the nexus of experience 
of which the given perception is a part” (KrV, A 226/B 279). 
Moreover, in such an inference, the type of connection between representation as effect 
and transcendental object as its cause would be uncognizable too, for it would never be an ob-
ject of experience itself, which would amount to a second reason to preclude that inference: 
[I]f one wanted to make entirely new concepts of substances, of forces, and of interactions 
from the material that perception offers us, without borrowing the example of their connec-
tion from experience itself, then one would end up with nothing but figments of the brain, 
for the possibility of which there would be no indications at all, since in their case one did 
not accept experience as instructress nor borrow these concepts from it. (KrV, A 222/B 269)
Still a third element of the Kantian theory of inferential cognition of existence precludes 
the inferential cognition of spatial things (as causes) from the existence of representations of 





spatial things. We cognize not the existence of a substance through a causal inference, but only 
the existence of its states: “it is not the existence of things (substances) but of their state of which 
alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only from other states, which are given in 
perception, in accordance with empirical laws of causality” (KrV, A 227/B 279). Certainly, such a 
condition holds even for empirical substances: 
[W]e cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given to us, and 
the mark of necessity in existence does not reach beyond the field of possible experience, and 
even in this it does not hold of the existence of things, as substances, since these can never be 
regarded as empirical effects, or as something that happens and arises. (KrV, A 227/B 280) 
To sum up, the possibility of the cognition of an existence comparatively a priori “concerns 
only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality, and the 
possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori from some given existence (a cause) to another 
existence (the effect)” (KrV, A 227/B 280).
For the above reasons, Kant refuses an inferential argument in the Criticism of the Fourth 
Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology and advocates immediate cognition of the existence 
of spatial substances (as representations). But the price for this is too high; from 1787 on, Kant 
himself seems to have scruples about the assimilation of bodies to mere representations. 
3. The Critical Concept of “Object”
At the end of the day, the refutation of idealism in the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism 
of Transcendental Psychology runs dangerously close to endorsing idealism when it claims that 
one should not be scandalized by the thesis that bodies are mere representations. In the Preface 
to the second edition of the first Critique, however – a text in which Kant famously coins the 
expression the “scandal of philosophy” (KrV, B xxxix) to refer to this idealism – he vigorously 
insists that outer objects should not be assimilated to mere representations. In other words, in 
1787, matter is no longer the same as representation of matter, but is rather “a thing distinct 
from all my representations and external” (KrV, B xli). In short, in 1787, Kant is not happy with 






outside me to which my sensibility relates” (KrV, B xl). The following reflections from 1788 also 
make clear this change in Kant’s position: 
1) “[That which persists] must be represented in relation to the mere receptivity of the 
mind, i.e., in relation to something affecting it, which is different from me” (Refl 5653, 18: 309).
2) “[I]ntuition must consist in a real relation to an object outside us and space really sig-
nifies something which, represented in this form of intuition, is possible only in a relation to a 
real thing outside of us” (Refl 6317, 18: 628).
3) “[Something outside of myself that corresponds to these representations] does not exist 
merely in my representation but rather as thing in itself” (Refl 6323, 18: 643, note).
What can such things, “distinct from all my representations and external”, be? From what 
I understand, they are neither the mere representations of the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism 
nor exactly the transcendently real object that we were told about in that context. We encounter 
explicit mention of a “thing in itself” in one of the reflections quoted above, while the others cle-
arly suggest this understanding of “object”. In order to avoid severe doctrinal incoherence, the 
“thing distinct from all my representations and external”, “to which my sensibility relates”, must 
be understood as “something that exists in itself (as does every object of experience), though it 
is not cognized as it is in itself” (Allison, 2004, p. 302, my italics). In other words, the thing that 
exists in itself is no longer the transcendental cause of the object of experience, and, in turn, the 
object of experience is no longer a mere representation.
The point at issue here is the possibility of distinguishing between a mere representation 
and its object in a way that avoids making the perceived object as such – the thing in space – into a 
thing in itself. Space is how the thing in itself appears to us. In the new Refutation of Idealism, Kant 
aims to prove that the outer object we experience must be assumed to be ontologically distinct 
from the self, space being the a priori condition under which we can relate to such an object rather 
than an ontological form of it. This is the novel sense of object of which Kant had been in need.
4. The Refutation of Idealism: first premise
In order to understand the argument in the Refutation of Idealism, we must first unders-





tand that the argument is not an inference of the type presented above. In the Refutation of 
Idealism, the cognition of the existence of outer objects is an immediate cognition, even though 
it is no longer a cognition of the existence of a mere representation. Indeed, what is fascinating 
about the argument in the second edition of the first Critique is a certain inversion of positions 
with regard to inner and outer experience: outer experience is now considered immediate expe-
rience, while that same immediacy is denied to inner experience. For example: 
1) “[H]ere it is proved that outer experience is really immediate” (KrV, B 276).
2) “[I]nner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer 
experience” (KrV, B 277. See also Refl 5653, 18: 306). 
However, the rejection of the immediacy of inner experience due to its dependence on 
outer experience may be misleading. What is at issue is the determination of outer experience as 
constitutive of inner experience: “even our inner experience […] is possible only under the presu-
pposition of outer experience” (KrV, B 275). Instead of being “the mere representation of a thing 
outside me” among other representations immediately present to the mind, “the existence of actu-
al things that I perceive” (KrV, B 275) is the factor that makes possible the temporal determination 
of the existence of inner states themselves. When Kant is clear about this, he says that the “thing 
distinct from all my representations and external” is “necessarily included in the determination of 
my own existence”; this “constitutes only a single experience, which could not take place even as 
inner if it were not simultaneously (in part) outer” (KrV, B xli). In other words, we now have to 
understand how and why the existence of matter is a part of inner experience itself. 
The first premise in the argument is exactly this: “I am conscious of my existence as de-
termined in time” (KrV, B 275). This premise does not seem especially problematic; it seems to 
assert only that we are capable of determining a temporal order in our representations.
5. The Refutation of Idealism: second premise
Nonetheless, the second premise – “All time-determination presupposes something per-
sistent in perception” (KrV, B 275) – does raise further issues. This premise basically amounts 
to a restatement of the First Analogy of Experience: “[i]n all change of appearances substance 






to return to this issue concerning the relation between the Refutation of Idealism and the First 
Analogy. At this point, I merely want to note that the proof of the First Analogy claims that the 
thorough empirical unity of time requires something that persists, but this may not amount to 
a claim about the existence of particular empirical objects; the substance to which Kant refers 
must exist for all time, while particular objects arise and perish (KrV, A 187-188/B 231). Since the 
self as an object of possible experience arises and perishes, it might not be this kind of primary 
substance. Since space is how we represent an object that is not the self, idealism appears to be 
refuted, for, according to the argument, no experience (or better, no through unity of experien-
ce) is possible without matter itself as the primary substance: an absolute persistent.1 
In short, provided that this kind of argument (which we are not going to critically examine 
here) is correct, the First Analogy contains a refutation of idealism. Nevertheless, this refutation 
depends on the thorough unity of experience as its premise. The proof of the First Analogy does 
not seem to contain a claim to the effect that the persistent thing required by each particular 
determination of time must be material. This point will be made in the Refutation of Idealism.
6. The Refutation of Idealism: third premise
The Refutation of Idealism teaches us that the persistent thing required by each time de-
termination might not amount to a representation of that thing, given the variable and chan-
geable character of every representation as such: “[t]he representation of something persisting 
in existence is not the same as a persisting representation; for that can be quite variable and 
changeable, as all our representations are, even the representations of matter, while still being 
related to something permanent, which must therefore be a thing distinct from all my represen-
tations and external” (KrV, B xli). Therefore, the persistent might not be something in me, even 
if the succession of representations in me were to repeat itself ad infinitum. 
In the Refutation, this statement amounts to the third premise of the argument: “[t]his 
1 For a similar argument, see EMUNDTS, 2010, p. 175ff and 182ff. See also ABELA, 2002, p. 186. 
Guyer disagrees with the notion that the First Analogy implies a refutation of idealism (1987, p. 308). 
However, he apparently does not consider the argument about the thorough unity of time requiring an 
everlasting substance.





persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me” (KrV, B 275). In the B Preface, Kant asks 
us to read this passage this way: “this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me” (KrV, B 
xxxix). From what I understand, the most relevant difference between the passage in the Refuta-
tion and the corresponding passage in the B Preface is the justification for that premise. 
In the Refutation, we read that the persistent thing cannot be something in me, because 
“my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing” (KrV, B 
275). Apparently, Kant means it would be circular to appeal to an empirical subject as a persis-
tent thing in order to determine internal experience, since an empirical subject would constitute 
the result of such an experience. But this point is not very compelling, since the same argument 
could apply to the relation between matter and external experience. Indeed, Kant insists that 
the persistent is an a priori concept, even though it is to be found in external experience. 
Why can’t the empirical subject simply be the way in which the persistent thing exhibits 
itself, as an a priori concept in internal experience? If I understand Kant’s point, the answer is 
that internal experience is made of representations, which are all “variable and changeable”: “all 
the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations” 
(KrV, B xxxix). There is nothing like impenetrability in inner sense. The new Preface is clear 
about this, and so is note 2 of the Refutation: 
[W]e do not even have anything persistent on which we could base the concept of a subs-
tance, as intuition, except merely matter, and even this persistence is not drawn from outer 
experience, but rather presupposed a priori as the necessary condition of all time-determi-
nation, thus also as the determination of inner sense in regard to our own existence through 
the existence of outer things. The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intui-
tion at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject. 
And hence this I does not have the least predicate of intuition that, as persistent, could serve 
as the correlate for time-determination in inner sense, as, say, impenetrability in matter, as 
empirical intuition, does. (B 277-278) 
In other words, it seems to be a fact about inner sense that it does not contain anything 
capable of exhibiting persistence. Here, Kant seems to follow Hume’s steps regarding the (em-
pirical) impossibility of the observation of identity by introspection since there is nothing un-






The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearan-
ce; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. 
[…] The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions 
only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where the-
se scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed. (THN, 1.4.6, 4)
Acceptance of the Humean theory of internal experience could be enough to explain 
why Kant finds the identity of an “I” only in the “merely intellectual representation of the self-
activity of a thinking subject”, which was already clear in the Transcendental Deduction (see, for 
instance, B 133-134). But there is more to the impossibility of endurance in inner sense, as we 
will see below.
7. The Refutation of Idealism: fourth premise and conclusion
Since we cannot discover persistence in inner sense, the fourth premise makes external 
experience the locus of empirical persistence “[t]hus the perception of this persistent thing is 
possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing 
outside me” (KrV, B 275).
The conclusion then follows easily: “[c]onsequently, the determination of my existence in 
time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself” 
(KrV, B 275). Or, in the Preface: “they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, 
in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can 
be determined” (KrV, B xxxix).
To sum up the argument: 
1) “I am conscious of my existence as determined in time” (KrV, B 275).
2) “All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception” (KrV, B 275).
3) “[T]his persisting element cannot be an intuition in me” (KrV, B xxxix).
4) “[T]he perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me” 
(KrV, B 275).





Conclusion: “the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the 
existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself” (KrV, B 275).
8. Understanding the Second and Third Premises
Let us return to the second statement regarding the First Analogy. I believe that Guyer 
makes a serious point when he asks “why something permanent is required for the special pur-
pose of recognizing subjective successions of representations, as opposed to making determi-
nate contrasts between such merely subjective successions and actual objective changes” (1987, 
p. 285. See also p. 286ff). According to Guyer, the mere happening of a succession of represen-
tations could be enough to justify the judgment that there is such a succession: “[w]hy is the 
successiveness of consciousness insufficient for its own recognition, and why should spatial, let 
alone independent objects be necessary for this purpose?” (1987, p. 293). I believe the answer to 
Guyer’s challenge involves an account from this passage from the proof of the First Analogy: 
Alteration can therefore be perceived only in substances, and arising or perishing per se 
cannot be a possible perception unless it concerns merely a determination of that which 
persists, for it is this very thing that persists that makes possible the representation of the 
transition from one state into another, and from non-being into being, which can therefore 
be empirically cognized only as changing determinations of that which lasts. If you assume 
that something simply began to be, then you would have to have a point of time in which 
it did not exist. But what would you attach this to, if not to that which already exists? For an 
empty time that would precede is not an object of perception; but if you connect this ori-
gination to things that existed antecedently and which endure until that which arises, then 
the latter would be only a determination of the former, as that which persists. It is just the 
same with perishing: for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time at which 
there is no longer an appearance. (KrV, A 187-188/ B 231)
It seems to me that experiences of the arising and perishing of external substances are 
quite similar to the experience of representations in succession, since representations arise and 
perish insofar as they follow each other. However, pointing out that one cannot perceive empty 
time is not sufficient to establish that we need to perceive something that endures between t1 






have representation A in t1 and representation B in t2, and have a determinate consciousness of 
this changing merely as time goes by? Why do I need space – and, moreover, something actual 
in space – in order to have the consciousness that time has passed and that my representations 
from then to now are different? 
In the General Note on the System of Principles, Kant gets closer than ever to an answer to 
these questions. In this note, Kant explains why the relation between outer sense and persistent 
objects is not contingent (as I suggested above in my account of the third premise concerning 
the existence of an intuition of impenetrability in outer sense and the absence of a correspon-
ding empirical inner intuition). Indeed, persistence is a structural element of outer experience 
because space is itself a possibility of coexistence of its parts, while such coexistence is impossi-
ble for the parts of time, which exist only in succession: “in order to give something that persists 
in intuition, corresponding to the concept of substance (and thereby to establish the objective 
reality of this concept), we need an intuition in space (of matter), since space alone persistently 
determines, while time, however, and thus everything that is in inner sense, constantly flows” 
(KrV, B 291). Thus, it is not just a matter of fact that representations are variable and changeable. 
They are so because time is the form of inner sense.
Furthermore, this note can help us to understand why persistence (and therefore space) is 
required even for perceptions of inner alterations (the succession of representations): “in order 
subsequently to make even inner alterations thinkable, we must be able to grasp time, as the 
form of inner sense, figuratively through a line, and grasp the inner alteration through the dra-
wing of this line (motion), and thus grasp the successive existence of ourself in different states 
through outer intuition” (KrV, B 291). Unfortunately, however, in order to explain why space is 
necessary for the grasping of time, Kant appeals to the statement that we are trying to unders-
tand here: “the real ground of which is that all alteration presupposes something that persists in 
intuition, even in order merely to be perceived as alteration, but there is no persistent intuition 
to be found in inner sense” (KrV, B 291).
It therefore seems that we are back at our starting point: why do I need a persistent thing 
in order for there to be any time determination? In truth, however, we have indeed moved 
forward. We have seen that parts can coexist only in space, in the sense that, in a determina-
tion of time in inner sense, our ability to represent “now” and “then” as such depends on our 





representing A in t1 and B in t2 as parts of the same whole representation. Past and current 
representations are equally constitutive of an empirical self. How would this be possible if we 
were to represent A and B only in time, such that all the parts existed only successively? The 
answer is that it simply would not be possible. Kant makes this point with all due clarity only 
in a Reflection:
I cannot cognize time as antecedently determined in order to determine my existence the-
rein […]. [I]n order to determine the latter empirically, something that persists must be 
given, in the apprehension of which I can cognize the succession of my representations and 
through which the simultaneity of a series in which every part passes away when another 
arises can alone be a whole. In which I posit my existence. (Refl 6313, 18: 615)
What makes correlation with space necessary for grasping time is therefore the same 
structural characteristic that makes persistence possible only in space: the possible simultaneity 
of parts of a series. This takes us to a re-reading of the synthesis of reproduction. In this section 
of the first version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, 
Kant says:
[I]t is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next, 
or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of 
these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose 
the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the 
successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed 
to the following ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously mentioned 
thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, 
could ever arise. (KrV, A 102)
Apparently, around 10 years later, when Kant is supposed to have written the above Re-
flection, he was willing to claim that if we had not been provided with outer sense (and only had 
imagination of something outer), we would always lose the preceding representations; it would 
be impossible to make preceding representations coexist with current ones were we to count on 
inner sense (time) alone. Hence, space is a necessary condition for a whole representation, such 






We cannot represent any number except through successive enumeration in time and 
then grasping this multiplicity together in the unity of a number. This latter, however, 
cannot happen except by my placing them beside one another in space: for they must be 
conceived as given simultaneously, i.e., as taken together in one representation, otherwise 
this multitude does not constitute a magnitude (number); but it is not possible to cognize 
simultaneity except insofar as, beyond my action of grasping it together, I can apprehend 
(not merely think) the multiplicity as given both forwards and backwards. There must 
thus be given in perception an intuition in which the manifold is represented outside 
of and beside each other, i.e., the intuition which makes possible the representation of 
space, in order to determine my own existence in time, i.e., an existence outside me lies 
at the ground of the determination of my own existence, i.e., the empirical consciousness 
of myself. (Refl 6314, 18: 616)
It must be noted that it is not sufficient to merely think about something persistent in 
which the manifold is given both forwards and backwards. A thought is a representation. I 
can represent something in space, but that representation as such is not in space but rather in 
time. Thus, it is a changeable representation of the permanent that is not itself permanent – i.e. 
it is not itself spatial. This is why Kant makes “an existence outside me” the ground of the very 
synthesis of the reproduction. The unity of the multitude of moments of time is only possible 
through something real in space, space being “the consciousness of this real relation” (Refl 6316, 
Leningrad Fragment I, 18: 623). 
Certainly, if something real in space is demanded by the unity of time in a represen-
tation, this does not mean that that representation is spatial in itself. As Guyer argues: “suc-
cessive representations in one’s own experience can be judged to be successive only if they 
are judged to be severally simultaneous with the severally successive states of some enduring 
object” (GUYER, 1987, p. 306). This means that “the problem can be solved by holding not 
that representations must themselves be spatial, but that they must be given a spatial location 
by being assigned to an object in space as their bearer – namely, the body of the perceiver” 
(GUYER, 1987, p. 312). At this point, we can understand why the Kantian self must be an 
“embodied perceiver” (GUYER, 1987, p. 313), or, as our title puts it, a “being in the world” – i.e. 
a body among other bodies.






Kant’s Refutation of Idealism might be considered a late rupture with the so-called phi-
losophy of the representation. After all, according to Kant’s considered position in the second 
edition of the first Critique, inner experience includes not only mere representations but also 
the persistent thing, which is to be understood in contradistinction to the mental states in ap-
prehension. Indeed, this remarkable passage – which contains the curious expression used in 
this paper’s title – could perhaps have been written by a twentieth-century philosopher: 
Although I am affected here, no inference is required in order to infer the existence of an 
outer object, because it is requisite for the consciousness of my own existence in time, thus 
for empirical self-consciousness (of simultaneity), and I therefore cognize myself as well. I 
am immediately and originally conscious of myself as a being in the world and only thereby is 
my own existence determinable as a magnitude in time. (Refl 6316, Leningrad Fragment I, 
18: 623, my italics)
Accordingly, space is no longer conceived as a mere “inner mode of representation” (KrV, 
A 378). Rather, it is the form of the “relation to a real thing outside of us” (Refl 6317, 18: 628). 
Kant therefore clarifies his Transcendental Idealism such that it involves not an ontological dis-
tinction between objects of experience as mere representations and things in themselves but an 
epistemic distinction between things themselves as they appear to us in (time and) space – the 
objects of experience – and those same things as they are in themselves. Consequently, from 
the second edition of the first Critique onwards, Kant’s self is a being in a world of real things 
that is immediately and originally accessible, space being that self’s form of openness to such 
a world. 
This mature version of Transcendental Idealism is the ground of the critical concept of 
“object”. The critical object is to be considered in contradistinction to a mere representation of 
a human cognizer, precisely because it is the thing that is independent of every mental act of 
referring to it in the synthesis of apprehension.
It is still to be noted that it is not a particular physical object that makes possible the 
determination of the self’s own existence as a magnitude in time. Rather, this is made possible 






then, only because I can cognize that I exist here and there. As Kant says above, I am originally 
conscious of “being in the world”. As Carl says about this same passage, “you have to conceive 
yourself as a “Weltwesen” […] – as a being that is somewhere at a given time” (2006, p. 190).
What is more, our being in the world is not cognized by an (indeed dubious) inference of 
the sort defended by other modern philosophers. Rather, this is our originary condition. And it 
is a scandal that one could think otherwise.
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de acordo com Kant, o idealismo é um “escândalo da filosofia”. ao contrário de hume, Kant não se satisfaz em 
notar que seres humanos não são capazes de abandonar suas crenças em coisas externas na vida prática. Kant 
pretende oferecer uma prova satisfatória da existência de coisas externas. neste artigo, eu argumento que a prova 
definitiva da existência de coisas externas que Kant tem a oferecer está fundamentalmente conectada à sua nova 
concepção do eu empírico como um ser no mundo (Weltwesen), uma concepção que emerge na segunda edição da 
primeira Crítica e é completamente articulada nas reflexões de 1788 em diante. Para mostrar isso, eu analiso a 
Refutação do Idealismo na Crítica ao Quarto Paralogismo da Psicologia Transcendental, a teoria kantiana da 
cognição de existências por inferência, a teoria crítica do “objeto” e a Refutação do Idealismo de 1787 em diante.
Palavras-chave: eu, objeto, idealismo, realismo, ser no mundo.
aBstract
according to Kant, idealism is a “scandal of philosophy”. unlike hume, Kant is not satisfied to point out that 
human beings are not capable of abandoning their belief in outer things in practical life. Kant aims to offer a 
satisfactory proof of the existence of outer things. my claim in this paper is that Kant’s definitive proof of the 
existence of outer things is fundamentally connected to his new conception of the empirical self as a being in the 
world (Weltwesen), a conception that emerges in the second edition of the first Critique and is fully articulated in 
reflections from 1788 onward. in order to make my point, i analyse the Refutation of Idealism in the Criticism 
of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology, the Kantian theory of inferential cognition of existences, 
Kant’s critical theory of the “object”, and the Refutation of Idealism from 1787 onward. 
Keywords: self, object, idealism, realism, being in the world.
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